Unexpected costs of high working memory capacity following directed forgetting and context change manipulations by Delaney, Peter F. et al.
Unexpected costs of high working memory capacity following directed forgetting and contextual change 
manipulations 
 
By: PETER F. DELANEY AND LILI SAHAKYAN  
 
Delaney, P. F., & Sahakyan, L. (2007).  Unexpected costs of high working memory capacity following directed  
 forgetting and context change manipulations.  Memory & Cognition, 35, 1074-1082. 
 
Made available courtesy of Psychonomic Society: http://www.psychonomic.org/index.html 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
Abstract: 
Greater working memory capacity is usually associated with greater ability to maintain information in the face 
of interruptions. In two experiments, we found that some types of interruptions actually lead to greater 
forgetting among high-span people than among low-span people. Specifically, an instruction designed to change 
mental context resulted in significant forgetting for high-span people but minimal forgetting among the low-
span people. Intentional forgetting instructions also resulted in greater forgetting among higher working 
memory capacity participants than among lower working memory capacity participants. A candidate 
explanation called the intensified context shift hypothesis is proposed which suggests that high-span people are 
more context dependent than low-span people. 
 
Article: 
In most tasks, the most relevant information should be kept active during processing while irrelevant 
information may be ignored or forgotten. The mechanisms that meet the need for active, selective storage 
during processing are referred to as working memory (WM) while working memory capacity (WMC) refers to 
quantitative measures of the ability to maintain relevant information while performing unrelated tasks. One of 
the prominent views of working memory is that WMC reflects control of attention by applying activation or 
suppression to memory representations (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). 
 
Memory representations are likely to contain information not only about studied items, but also about the 
context in which they were acquired. Context may be conceptualized as information that is not directly relevant 
to accomplishing the task, but that is nonetheless present during processing. Physical environment, internal 
states, and extra-task thoughts are part of contextual information that accompanies item processing. Some of 
these contextual cues are continuously present during study, such as the physical environment, whereas others 
are transitory and change throughout the task, such as the mood or extra-task thoughts. It is widely established 
that when the test context and the learning context mismatch, forgetting is observed (for a review, see Smith & 
Vela, 2001). 
 
Context is becoming an important construct in memory research and is part of many formal memory models. 
For example, Mensink and Raaijmakers (1988) have shown that contextual fluctuation over time can account 
for a variety of interference effects (and many other memory phenomena). Interestingly, research exploring 
interference phenomena from an individual differences perspective shows that WMC mediates susceptibility to 
interference. For example, high-span people are better than low-span people at resisting proactive interference 
(Kane & Engle, 2000), show less output interference when retrieving category exemplars (Rosen & Engle, 
1997), and show smaller fan effects (Bunting, Conway, & Heitz, 2004; Cantor & Engle, 1993; Conway & 
Engle, 1994). Typically, ability to resist interference among high-span people is attributed to better attentional 
control applied to memory representations. If memory representations contain contextual information, and 
fluctuations of context can account for interference effects, then it is possible a relationship exists between 
WMC and control of context. 
 
Given the theorized links between WMC, context, and interference, we sought to explore the relationship 
between the amount of forgetting following context change and WMC. The specific task we used to manipulate 
context was invented by Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) to help test their context-based account of list-method 
directed forgetting (invented by Bjork, LaBerge, & LeGrand,1968). Typical list-method studies involve 
presenting participants a list of study items (List 1), following which half of the participants are told to keep 
remembering the items for a later memory test, while the other half are told to forget those items (e.g., ―that list 
was just for practice‖). Then another list (List 2) is then studied, and participants receive a final free recall test 
on both lists. People show reduced access to List 1 items following a forget instruction than following a 
remember instruction – a phenomenon known as the ―costs‖ of directed forgetting. Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) 
collected retrospective reports that indicated that the forget instruction led some participants to focus their 
thoughts on something other than the study material (by thinking of something else). Participants often reported 
thinking of past or future events, such as their upcoming wedding or the chores they had planned to do. 
Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) proposed that engaging in diversionary thoughts allowed participants to sample 
new contextual elements, which are in place when the second list is encoded. At the time of the final test (which 
follows the study of List 2), the available contextual cues match List 2 better than List 1. The mismatch 
between the study and test contexts in the forget group produces impaired List 1 recall. 
 
To test the context based explanation of directed forgetting, they employed a context-change manipulation 
aimed at changing mental context after the study of List 1. They told the participants after List 1 to keep 
remembering it for a later test but also to think back to their childhood home, mentally visualize it and describe 
it for 45 sec. The context-change instruction was hypothesized to produce a directed-forgetting-like effect, 
namely a reduction of List 1 memory. Consistent with the predictions, they obtained forgetting of List 1 items 
following both context-change and forget instructions, which did not differ from each other. Importantly, when 
Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) mentally reinstated the original learning context at the time of the final test, they 
observed significant reduction of forgetting in the forget group as well as the context change group, lending 
support for the involvement of context in both directed forgetting and the context-change task. The effects of 
context-change instructions have been replicated in Sahakyan and Delaney (2003) even when encoding strategy 
was controlled. 
 
The present studies approached the directed forgetting and context change tasks from an individual differences 
perspective. Normally, when told to keep remembering information during the processing of an irrelevant task, 
we should expect people with high working memory spans to remember more information than low-span 
people. In fact, this is the basis of the span tasks often used to measure WMC (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980; Engle et al., 1999). Furthermore, one would generally expect that if high-span people tried to forget 
things, they should be better at it than low-span people. There is some limited support for this claim, as Brewin 
and Beaton (2002) showed that high-span people are better than low-span people at avoiding thinking about 
topics that they are instructed to suppress. Thus there are good reasons to expect that high- span people may 
respond differently to a context change instruction (when they are supposed to keep remembering) or to a forget 
instruction (where they are supposed to forget) compared to low-span people. That is, we predict that high-span 
people will be more resistant to context change and therefore will have better List 1 recall than low-span people 
following context change tasks. Also, we predict greater directed forgetting effect in high-span people (and 
therefore, worse List 1 recall) compared to low-span people. 
 
However, these predictions would contradict the context change account of directed forgetting because they 
imply that the two types of instructions (forget and con text change) behave differently. On the other hand, if 
the effects of the forget instruction and the context change instruction rely on similar mechanisms as Sahakyan 
and Kelley suggested, then we should predict similar effects of the two types of instruction on List 1 memory. 
Therefore, the effects of the directed forgetting and context change instructions on List 1 memory should be 
similar – either high-span people should show better memory for List 1 following either instruction, or they 
should show worse memory for List 1 following either instruction (compared to low-span people). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In this study, we explored the direction and degree of correlation between WMC and free recall following di-
rected forgetting and context change instructions (compared to a remember control instruction). The standard 
list-method directed forgetting paradigm was employed in which people studied two lists and received the 
instruction (remember, forget, or context-change) between the lists. No special instructions were provided to 




Participants. Participants were I32 introductory psychology students tested individually. 
 
Materials. Two lists of I5 medium-frequency words were drawn from the Francis and Kucera (I982) norms. 
Each list appeared equally often as the first or second study list. 
 
Procedure. Participants were presented with the first list of I5 words at 5 sec/word, and were instructed to learn 
and memorize them for a later memory test. After the study of List I, one-third of the participants were told that 
the list they had studied was only for practice, that there was no need to remember it, and to try to forget the 
words (the forget condition). One-third of the participants were told that the list they had studied included only 
the first half of the items, and that they should remember them for a later memory test (the remember 
condition). The remaining participants received the remember instructions, but additionally engaged in one of 
Sahakyan and Kelley’s (2002) mental context-change tasks (the context-change condition). The context-change 
task lasted 45 sec and involved imagining walking through their parents’ house and describing it to the 
experimenter, including details about furniture and its location. To equate the amount of time between the two 
study lists, participants in the forget and remember conditions performed speeded reading for 45 sec. They were 
instructed to ignore the content of the passage and the punctuation marks and read aloud as fast as possible as 
we were measuring their reading speed. Actually, the purpose was to preclude rehearsal in the remember 
control group without dramatically changing mental context. Prior pilot work with this task showed that it 
produced less forgetting than the forget or the context change instructions. 
 
Everyone then studied List 2, which was always followed by the remember instruction. Final recall was 
preceded by a 90 sec retention interval filled with arithmetic problems. Recall was carried out on separate 
sheets of paper, starting with List I followed by List 2, with 60 sec allotted for recall of each list. 
 
Finally, participants completed the standard operation span (OSPAN) task measuring WMC (e.g., Kane, 
Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 200I; Turner & Engle, I989). OSPAN involved verifying arithmetic equations 
while trying to remember words. Each trial consisted of several paired equations and words (e.g., IS (9/3) + 2 = 
5 ? DRILL), presented one at a time. Participants read the equations aloud, verified them, and read the to-be-
memorized word. They were not allowed to pause or rehearse. After the trial ended, they wrote down the words 
in the order of presentation. The OSPAN score was calculated by summing the number of words on correct trials. 
A trial was correct if all the presented words from that trial were recalled in the right order. 
 
Three trials of each length (from two to five equation/word pairs) were presented. Participants were unaware in 
advance of the number of words on a given trial. The possible range of scores was from 0 to 42. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants’ OSPAN scores ranged from 4 to 32, with a mean of 13.30 (SD = 6.60), with low skew (0.68) and 
kurtosis (0.25). The OSPAN scores deviated significantly from normality, Shapiro–Wilk’s W(132) = .960,p 
<.01 . However, converting the OSPAN scores to z scores did not affect the pattern of the results, so for 
simplicity we have used the untransformed values. 
 
Global analysis of costs. Proportion List 1 recall was analyzed by instruction (remember, forget, or context-
change) using a one-way ANOVA to verify that the contextual change manipulation was effective, replicating 
Sahakyan and Kelley’s (2002) findings. The effect of instruction was significant [F(2,129) = 17.48, MSe = .027, 
p < .001]. Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests showed that the remember group recalled a larger proportion of words 
from List 1 (M = .4 1, SD = .15) than the forget (M = .2 1, SD = .20) or context-change (M = .27, SD = .14) 
groups, which did not differ. 
 
Individual differences analyses. We employed regression to examine the proportion of List 1 recall variance 
captured by instruction, WMC, and the Instruction X WMC interaction. Instruction was represented as two con-
trast-coded variables that reflected orthogonal contrasts. Following the procedure recommended by Jaccard and 
Turrisi (2003), we first simultaneously entered the main effects and then determined if the interaction term ex-
plained significant additional variance. The total model was significant [F(5,126) = 10.52,p <.001], explaining 
29% of the variance. We detected a significant instruction X WMC interaction [F(2,121) = 6.55, p < .005, ΔR
2
 
= .07]. Thus, the effect of instruction was moderated by WMC. 
 
We next fit separate regression lines to the proportion of List 1 recall for each instruction. Figure 2 shows the 
best-fitting regression lines for each condition and Table 1 gives relevant statistics and regression coefficients. 
In all three conditions, WMC accounted for significant variance. In the remember condition, higher working 
memory capacity was associated with higher recall. However, in the context-change and forget conditions, 
participants with higher WMC recalled fewer List 1 words than participants with lower WMC. Context change 
instructions hurt high-span people more than low-span people, reversing the usual positive relationship between 
WMC and retention. 
 
Finally, Table 2 shows the mean List 1 recall for each instruction for the top and bottom third of participants 
based on their OSPAN scores. The mean OSPAN scores were 20.8 (SD = 4.96) for the high-span group and 6.7 
(SD = 2.62) for the low-span group. 
 
Analyses of benefits. Our primary interest in the present study was in List 1 memory. However, both forget in-
structions and context-change instructions often lead to better List 2 memory than remember instructions 
(known as the ―benefits‖). We have argued elsewhere that directed forgetting benefits emerge because 
participants in the forget condition (and disrupted context condition) adopt more efficient study strategies when 
they encode List 2 compared to List 1. The choice of better study strategy is often driven by self-evaluation of 
the efficiency of current encoding (e.g., Sahakyan & Delaney, 2003, 2005; Sahakyan, Delaney, & Kelley, 
2004). Because both the forget instruction and the mental context change instruction disrupt ongoing rehearsal, 
participants in these conditions may be more inclined to reflect on their performance and change strategies. The 
remember group participants, on the other hand, may be less willing to disrupt ongoing rehearsal and are 
therefore less likely to change study strategy between the two lists. However, when participants in a remember 
group give a quick judgment about how many words they will recall on the test, they improve memory for List 
2 to the level of the forget group participants (Sahakyan et al., 2004). 
 
In the present study, the speeded reading task inserted after List 1 study also interrupted rehearsal in the control 
 
 
remember group, and therefore we did not expect strategy change rates to differ across conditions. A one-way 
ANOVA on List 2 recall found no significant effects of instruction (F < 1). The mean List 2 recall was .38 (SD 
= .20) for the remember condition, .40 (SD = .22) for the context-change condition, and .42 (SD = .19) for the 
forget condition. 
 
We also used regression analysis to examine the proportion of variance in List 2 recall as a function of 
instruction, working memory, and the Instruction X WMC interaction. Figure 3 shows best-fitting regression 
lines for each instruction and the relevant statistics and regression coefficients are displayed in Table 1, and 
Table 2 shows the List 2 recall rates for the top and bottom third of CSPAN scorers for each instruction. The 
total model approached significance [F(5,126) = 2.11,p = .07]. Only WMC was a significant predictor of recall 
[F(1,126) = 8.44, p < .005], capturing 6% of the variance. The best-fitting line was p(R) = .31 + (.008 * WMC), 
indicating that higher- span people tended to recall more List 2 words than lower- span people did. Neither 
instruction nor the instruction X WMC interaction were significant (both Fs < 1). Taken together, the results 
suggest that higher-span people recalled more List 2 items regardless of instruction. 
 
Conclusions. Participants were told to keep remembering a studied list in two conditions and to forget a studied 
list in another condition. In the context-change condition, participants’ attention was diverted from the main 
task of memorizing words with another meaningful activity (thinking of their parents’ house). The context 
change manipulation resulted in worse recall of List 1 items for high-span people than for low-span people. In 
contrast, high-span participants in the control remember condition (that did not undergo dramatic changes in 
mental context) recalled more List 1 items than low-span participants. Finally, the directed forgetting 
manipulation behaved like the context change instruction in that high-span people showed poorer List 1 recall 
following directed forgetting instructions compared to low-span people. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The results of Experiment 1 were sufficiently surprising that we felt a need to replicate the greater forgetting 
among high-span people than among low-span people following a context-change task. 
  
One motivation was to explore whether the WMC and forgetting interaction observed in Experiment 1 could be 
specific to OSPAN or whether it generalized to other WMC measures. Because OSPAN and list learning both 
involve word learning, similar encoding strategies might apply to both tasks. People select different encoding 
strategies to learn lists of words and often change to more effective encoding strategies when they study 
multiple lists (Delaney & Knowles, 2005; Sahakyan & Delaney, 2003). Because we conducted our working 
memory task (OSPAN) after the word memory task, and because OSPAN also involved word learning, perhaps 
those who selected better encoding strategies during learning also did better on OSPAN because they used the 
same better encoding strategies in OSPAN. If so, then the measure of span would have been contaminated.To 
address this possibility, we used a different span task called the counting span (CSPAN) that has been 
previously used by Engle et al. (1999). CSPAN does not involve word memory and therefore we would not ex-
pect strategy transfer between the list learning and CSPAN tasks. However, there is ample evidence that 
OSPAN and CSPAN are highly correlated and that they reflect WMC (Engle et al., 1999). 
 
Alternatively, even if participants did not transfer strategies between the OSPAN and list-learning tasks, 
perhaps high-span people generally tend to select different encod- 
 
ing strategies than low-span people. If so, then the greater vulnerability of higher-span people to context 
changes could be because the particular encoding strategies they selected were more vulnerable to context 
change than the encoding strategies selected by lower-span people. To address this concern, we controlled 
encoding strategy in Experiment 2. Following Sahakyan and Delaney (2003), participants studied each list by 
creating a story using all of the words on the list. 
 
Method 
Participants. Participants were I08 undergraduates who were tested individually. 
 
Materials. The Experiment I materials were used. 
 
Procedure. The procedure followed Experiment I, except we included an encoding strategy instruction and 
changed the task used to measure WMC. Participants were instructed to create a story using all of the items on 
each list, creating the story aloud to ensure compliance. Two participants who failed to follow instructions were 
replaced. 
 
WMC was assessed using the counting span (CSPAN) task, which is analogous to OSPAN except that instead 
of equation/word pairs, there are randomly arranged screens of dark blue circles, dark blue squares, and light 
blue circles. Participants counted the number of dark blue circles aloud and memorize the final total for each 
screen. After each trial, they recalled the totals in order. The CSPAN score was the sum of the recalled totals for 
all correctly recalled sets. Three sets of each length (from two to six screens) were presented in an unpredictable 
order. The possible range of scores was from 0 to 60. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Scores on the CSPAN task ranged from 7 to 46, with a mean of 25.3 (SD = 8.62), with low skew (.03) and 
kurtosis (-0.53). The distribution of the CSPAN scores was approximately normally distributed [Shapiro–Wilk’s 
W(109) = .988,p = .46]. 
 
Global analyses of costs. A one-way ANOVA on proportion correct List 1 recall revealed instruction effects 
[F(2,105) = 5.77, MSe = .034, p < .005]. Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests revealed that the forget group (M = .41, SD 
= .18) and the context-change group (M = .42, SD = .21) both recalled significantly fewer items than the re-
member group (M = .55, SD = .16). The forget and con- text-change groups did not reliably differ. These results 
closely replicated an earlier strategy control experiment from Sahakyan and Delaney (2003). 
 
Individual differences analyses. We used regression analysis to examine the proportion of List 1 items 
recalled as a function of WMC, instruction, and their interaction. Instruction was represented as two orthogonal 
contrast- coded variables. As in Experiment 1, we first entered the two main effects and then tested whether the 
interaction term explained additional variance. The total model was significant [F(5,102) = 5.3 1, p < .00 1], 
accounting for 21% of the variance. A significant instruction X WMC interaction emerged [F(2,102) = 3.9 1, p 
< .05, ΔR
2
 = .06], indicating that the effect of instruction depended on WMC. 
 
To follow up the interaction, we fit separate regression lines to the proportion of List 1 items recalled for each 
of the instructions (forget, remember, and context-change). Best-fitting regression lines are shown as Figure 3 
and relevant statistics and regression coefficients are given in Table 3. Higher WMC was associated with 
greater forgetting following the context-change instruction and the intentional forgetting instruction. WMC was 
not a significant predictor of List 1 recall in the remember group. 
 
Lastly, Table 4 gives the mean List 2 recall for each instruction for the top and bottom third of participants 
based on their CSPAN scores. The mean CSPAN scores were 34.9 (SD = 4.2) for the high-span group and 15.8 
(SD = 4.2) for the low-span group. 
 
Analyses of benefits. The ―benefits‖ of forget and context-change instructions on List 2 recall are not found 
when encoding strategies are controlled (Sahakyan & Delaney, 2003). Therefore, we did not expect benefits. 
The proportion of List 2 items recalled in the forget (M = .65, SD = .14), context-change (M = .63, SD = .15), 
and remember (M = .61, SD = .14) groups did not differ (F < 1). 
 
 
There was neither a significant relationship between WMC and List 2 recall nor an interaction effect (both Fs < 
1). Best-fitting regression lines are shown as Figure 4 and relevant statistics and regression coefficients are in 
Table 3. Table 4 gives the List 2 recall rates for the high-span and low-span group (based on CSPAN scores) 
for each cue. Neither List 1 memory in the remember condition nor List 2 memory in any condition were 
reliably predicted by WMC. Thus, controlling encoding strategy attenuated the positive relationship between 
working memory capacity and recall seen in Experiment 1. Perhaps WMC enhances free recall performance 
because high-span people select better study strategies than low- span people do. 
 
Conclusions. We replicated the findings of Experiment 1 by finding that a context change manipulation re-
sulted in greater forgetting among high-span people than among low-span people. We also found that high-span 
people were better able to intentionally forget items than low-span people following explicit instructions to 
forget. 
 
The interaction between WMC and instruction (forget, remember, or context-change) remained despite control-
ling study strategy and replacing OSPAN with CSPAN as the measure of WMC. However, controlling encod-
ing strategy did eliminate the advantage of having high WMC on recall in the control remember condition. 
Thus, encoding strategy differences might mediate the recall advantages of high-span people, but they do not 




In two experiments, we explored the relationship between WMC and the amount of forgetting following ma-
nipulations of context change and directed forgetting. Both experiments involved studying two lists and the 
instruction was delivered after the first list. In Experiment 1, participants were free to learn the items in any way 
they pleased. In Experiment 2, we controlled the encoding strategy across all participants. The remember group, 
which was not exposed to context change or directed forgetting manipulations, produced better List 1 memory 
among high-span people than among low-span people in Experiment 1, but the high-span advantage was 
eliminated when strategy was controlled in Experiment 2. In contrast, both the instruction to forget and the 
disruption of context manipulation produced greater forgetting among high-span people than among low-span 
people in both experiments. As the context-change group was instructed to keep remembering List 1 items 
before receiving context-change instructions, they would have no reason to intentionally inhibit List 1 items. 
These results suggest that high WMC may not always be advantageous when trying to resist forgetting during 
an interruption. 
 
These findings are relevant both to directed forgetting and to the effects of disruptions as a function of working 
memory. We first discuss the relationship between WMC and directed forgetting, and then the relationship 
between WMC and context change. 
 
Directed Forgetting and WMC 
Our results indicated that directed forgetting effects were moderated by WMC, with the forgetting effect driven 
more by high-span people than low-span people, who were apparently unable to comply with a forget 
instruction. In both experiments, high-span people showed impaired List 1 memory, whereas low-span people 
did not. We also replicated Sahakyan and Kelley’s (2002) finding that a context-change group mimicked the 
recall pattern of a group instructed to forget (see also Sahakyan & Delaney, 2003). Furthermore, the degree of 
memory impairment resulting from the context change was inversely related to WMC just like the relationship 
between the amount of forgetting initiated by directed forgetting instruction and WMC. 
 
A negative relationship between WMC and directed forgetting is consistent with earlier findings. Macrae, 
 
Bodenhausen, Milne and Ford (1997) and M. Conway, Harries, Noyes, Racsmány and Frankish (2000) found 
that dividing attention during study resulted in reduced directed forgetting costs. Dividing attention would re-
duce available WM resources and hence decrease context change. A recent fMRI study on directed forgetting 
found enhanced activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex near Brodmann’s area (BA) 9 in the forget 
condition as compared to the remember condition—a region often involved in WM tasks as well (Knox, 2002). 
Impaired attentional control might also explain why patients with frontal lesions show reduced directed 
forgetting (Conway & Fthenaki, 2003). 
 
Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) originally designed their context-change task to test their context-change account 
of directed forgetting, according to which the context-change group should behave identically to the forget 
group. That is because the context-change account of directed forgetting proposes that people attempt to comply 
with a forget instruction by sampling new contextual elements (for example, by deliberately thinking of 
something else), with which they encode the second list. The context-change task simulates this process without 
the intent to forget, and therefore should produce comparable costs. Therefore, the finding that WMC has the 
same relationship to List 1 recall in the forget and context-change conditions provides yet one more parallel 
finding for the forget and the context change groups. Although similar behavioral outcomes in the forget and 
context change groups do not rule out the involvement of other mechanisms in directed forgetting, the lack of 
dissociations between these two conditions is consistent with the context based hypothesis of directed 
forgetting. 
 
Context and WMC 
The most unexpected finding in our study was that the context-change task led to more forgetting among high-
span than among low-span people. To explain the effects of WMC differences on the context change task, we 
consider three hypotheses. The common theme across all hypotheses is that low-span people are less context- 
dependent than high-span people during encoding and/or retrieval of memories. 
 
One possibility, called the deficient contextual binding hypothesis, is that low-span people do not bind 
contextual information to studied items as efficiently as high-span people (for evidence that supports deficient 
contextual binding, see Unsworth & Engle, 2006). According to the deficient contextual binding hypothesis, 
low-span people would suffer little from context change manipulation compared to a control remember group. 
High-span people, on the other hand, should suffer considerably from context changes if they were more 
efficient at binding contextual information to the studied items. (A variant on this hypothesis would propose 
that low-span people are less efficient at storing context, not at binding contexts to events.) Although this 
hypothesis can explain why context change hurts high-span people more than low-span people (compared to 
their respective remember baselines), it is unclear why high-span people do worse than low-span people fol-
lowing a context change. If low-span people were less likely to bind the context to the items than high-span 
people, then changes of context should hurt high-span more than low-spans compared to no context change 
(which we found). However, it is hard to understand why the low- span people (who did not bind the items to 
the context) should ever have any advantage over high-span people (who created more item-to-context 
associations)—even after context is changed. Thus, it seems that a contextual binding problem in low-span 
people has trouble explaining the present results. 
 
A second possibility is a context-susceptible strategies hypothesis suggesting that low-span and high-span 
people rely on qualitatively different strategies while learning and retrieving the items. The strategies of low-
span people may not be disrupted by contextual changes, perhaps because they pay no attention to context to 
begin with and instead learned the items in some other way that minimized the involvement of context at the 
time of retrieval. On the other hand, high-span people use encoding strategies that rely heavily on context. 
Under ordinary circumstances the strategies of high-span people lead to better memory, but when context is 
changed, they suffer more than low-spans. For example, low-span people might rely on interitem associations at 
study and test, while high-span people rely heavily on context-item associations. Experiment 2, in which 
encoding strategies were equated, provides some evidence against the different encoding hypothesis. High- 
span participants had no recall advantage over low-span in the Experiment 2 remember group. However, recall 
rates following the context change manipulation still showed disproportionate forgetting in high-spans over 
low-spans. 
 
Finally, a third possibility is the intensified context shift hypothesis, which suggests that the degree of context 
change is larger in magnitude in high-span than low-span people. We propose that low-span people may be less 
able to access the context and change it compared to high-span people. One way through which context change 
may be intensified in high-span people is that they may put more effort into performing context-change tasks 
than low- span people. Another way that a richer context might be produced is if WMC is correlated in some 
way with the strength or type of memories surrounding one’s childhood home. Perhaps, for example, emotional 
associations with childhood are stronger for high-span people than for low-span people, resulting in a greater 
change of mood and thus more context change during the parents’ house task. 
 
Consistent with the intensified context shift hypothesis, high-spans showed more impairment of List 1 recall 
than the low-spans following both directed forgetting and the context-change manipulations. Furthermore, the 
intensified context shift hypothesis can explain why low-span people recalled more List 1 items following a 
context shift than high-span people – it is not that low span people do not encode context well, but rather that 
they do not shift context well, which protects them from the context-dependent forgetting that is observed in 
high-span people. 
 
The intensified context change hypothesis also provides an explanation of why high-span people are often able 
to resist proactive interference more effectively than low- span people are. Kane and Engle (2000) found that 
low- span people showed higher levels ofproactive interference compared to high-span people when studying 
word lists drawn from a single semantic category (e.g., animals). While high-span and low-span people recalled 
about the same number of items on the first list, low-span people recalled fewer items from later lists compared 
to high-span people. If high-span people are better able to change contexts, perhaps they do so when they are 
tested repeatedly under conditions with high proactive interference buildup. Because context changes reduce 
proactive interference (see Smith & Vela, 2001, for a review), high-spans would show reduced proactive 
interference compared to low- spans. If high-span people change contexts more often, one might expect that 
high-span people should show reduced access to earlier-studied items relative to low-span participants after 
studying highly interfering lists. Consistent with this prediction, a paired-associates study by Rosen and Engle 
(1998) found that high-span participants forgot more earlier-studied items on a cued recall test relative to low-
span participants after studying an additional list of interfering items. They suggested that high-span people sup-
pressed the List 1 items to avoid interference. However, this is also the pattern of results one would expect if 
high-span participants set up a new mental context to help reduce proactive interference: items in an earlier 
context would be less accessible, while items in the current context would suffer less proactive interference. 
Notably, the intensified context shift hypothesis does not predict a general ability to resist all types of 
interference, such as dual-task interference (cf. Oberauer, Lange & Engle, 2004). 
 
Other studies seem consistent with the notion that high WMC is associated with more effective context change. 
Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987, p. 7) argued that the most successful participants in thought-
suppression tasks (―don’t think of a white bear‖) could dissociate the suppression context from the original 
context. Many participants reported intentionally trying to think of something else, but unsuccessful 
participants often found themselves thinking about uninteresting features of the original study context (e.g., 
light switches) that triggered recall of the to-be-suppressed item. Effective thought-suppressors thought of 
things outside of the original study context. Effective thought suppression was also positively related to WMC, 
perhaps reflecting more effective control over context in high-span people (Brewin & Beaton, 2002). 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, our studies show that certain kinds of interruptions may be more disruptive for high-span people 
than low-span people. Given that research with mental context change is at its young stages and needs further 
investigation, it is impossible to know which specific elements of the disruption activity were responsible for 
context change. For example, one may speculate that thinking about childhood home is likely to create a 
meaningful and rich internal representation, whereas speeded reading is probably less likely to do so. Hence, 
thinking about childhood home may lead to greater changes in mental context than engaging in a meaningless 
speeded reading task. Further research is needed to identify which tasks are likely to create greater (versus 
smaller) context change and hence, hurt memory of high-span people more than low-span people. 
 
Our studies also showed that WMC mediates the directed forgetting effect as well. It would be interesting to see 
whether populations that have diminished executive control ability, such as older adults, also show reduced 
context change effects (like young adults with low WMC). If not, it might point to different underlying causes 
for low WMC in young adults and WMC decline in older adults. 
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